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ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Meet the Standards for Summaiy Dismissal 
Although the State is generally accurate in its description of 
standards, the Petitioner wishes to make sure the Court is fully advised of 
all of the relevant holdings of the cited cases. We shall discuss each in 
turn: 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). 
The State cites this case for the proposition that "[a] petition for post-
conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in 
which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to 
relief. Bearshield does not reference the "burden" in such a a case, but 
there is no dispute that an "application for post-conviction relief was an 
entirely new proceeding, distinct from the criminal action which led to 
his conviction." 
Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 863, 979 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 
1999). Although this case stands for the proposition that "Like a plaintiff 
in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of 
evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief 
is based." Id. at 863. However, Downing also went on to explain that 
"[s]ummary dismissal of an application pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
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19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 
56." Id. The Downing court went on to warn that, "[s]ummary dismissal is 
permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine 
issue of material fact, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would 
entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is 
presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Citing Gonzales v. 
State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct.App.1991); Hoover v. 
State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct.App.1988); Ramirez v. 
State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct.App.1987). 
Downing also described the standard required for sufficient notice. 
The district court must provide the applicant with adequate notice of the 
reasons for its contemplated dismissal; however, simply echoing the 
language of LC. § 19-4906(b) is insufficient to provide such notice. The 
Downing court cited to the standard in Banks v. State, 123 Idaho 953, 954, 
855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993). What happened in Banks, likewise happened in 
this case. In that case, the notice generally mirrored the language in the 
statute. Most importantly, the Banks trial court raised new reasoning and 
addressed Banks' claims for the first time in its Order of Dismissal. Id. 
Likewise in this case, the trial court sought to make "judicial notice" of 
additional review of the sentencing audio in justification of its decision. 
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This was not properly included in the notice in order to give the 
Appellant proper notice and opportunity to respond. 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 
(1995). The State cites this case for the proposition that "the court must 
give the petitioner notice of the reasons for its contemplated dismissal, 
and an opportunity, within 20 days, to respond." This simply repeats the 
requirement of the statute. LC. § 19-4906(b). However, in that case the 
Saykhamchone court recognized the trial court's error in not providing 
sufficient notice. It noted, if Saykhamchone had been given a twenty-day 
notice of the district court's "intention to dismiss the application and its 
reasons for so doing, " Saykhamchone might have been able to respond 
in a way that would raise a genuine issue of material fact. LC. § 19-
4906(b) (emphasis added) ("In light of the reply ... the court may ... grant 
leave to file an amended application or, direct that the proceedings 
otherwise continue.") Likewise, if the state had filed a motion for 
summary disposition, Saykhamchone's reply might have been able to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact." Saykhamchone at 323. 
In this case, the affidavits declared and even the cited portion of the 
"judicially noticed" record supported a finding of misadvice when viewed 
in a light most favorable to the petitioner. Instead, in this case, the Court 
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made its own determination without an evidentiary hearing. Whether or 
not the petitioner was affirmatively misadvised is a matter of disputed 
fact. Rather than simply ruling on its own belief concerning the evidence, 
the Court should have allowed an evidentiary hearing. 
Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 158, 715 P.2d 369, 371 (Ct. App. 
1986). The most important point in this case involves not the 20-day 
notice requirement, but that additional notice must be given if the Court 
dismisses on different grounds. To rule on additional evidence not 
originally included in the Court's Notice of Intent clearly implicated the 
issue of additional notice. Additionally, in instant case, there is clearly a 
disputed fact concerning the misadvice. 
Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758,759,653 P.2d 813, 814 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The dismissal of Gibbs' petition was reversed in that case because 
although the State had moved for dismissal, the Court had dismissed the 
case on different grounds. Obviously, we likewise assert that it was error 
for the Court in instant case to take judicial notice of additional evidence 
and rely on that evidence in support of its Order to Dismiss without 
allowing the petitioner to respond. 
Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,517,211 P.3d 123,126 (Ct. App. 2009). 
It is unclear why the State has cited to this case. ("However, if a district 
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court summarily dismisses a post-conviction application relying in part 
on the same grounds presented by the state in its motion for summary 
dismissal, the notice requirement has been met."). Since there was no 
motion by the State in instant case, Buss has no relevance to the issue 
presented in this appeal. 
B. The Untimely Petition Should Be Allowed Based on Equitable Tolling. 
Equitable tolling is a legal principle directly tied to the petitioner's 
due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to present his or her 
claims. See Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 536, 944 P.2d 127, 133 
(Ct.App.1997}; Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 385, 924 P.2d 1225, 1229 
(Ct.App.1996}. Although the Idaho Court of Appeals insturcted in Chico-
Rodriguez v. State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct.App.2005), 
"American courts generally have applied equitable tolling only in rare 
and exceptional circumstances beyond the petitioner's control that 
prevented him or her from filing a timely petition." Therefore, "the bar for 
equitable tolling for post-conviction actions is high." Id. Cited in Leer v. 
State, 148 Idaho 112,115,218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009). 
We assert that affirmative misrepresentation constitutes 
"extraordinary circumstances" which were outside the Petitioner's 
control. As presented in both the Petitioner's and his father's affidavits, 
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and confirmed by the father's testimony at sentencing, it is undeniable 
that the Petitioner and his father were functioning under the misadvice of 
their attorneys. It is reasonable to believe that an attorney is giving proper 
legal advice and to rely and react based on that advice. Each time the 
Petitioner waived important rights, it was based on this misadvice. 
What the Court and the State now suggest is that despite relying on 
this errant advice, that the Petitioner somehow should have known that 
he needed to petition for post-conviction relief even though they did not 
learn the advice was errant for several years. This doesn't make sense. If a 
defendant knows the advice is errant, then he wouldn't rely upon it. If a 
defendant doesn't know the advice is errant, how would he know that he 
should file an ineffective assistance claim? Zipprich v. State (this case) 
should come to be known for its holding that affirmative legal misadvice 
is outside the control of the Petitioner, and reasonable reliance upon such 
advice is a basis for equitable tolling. 
C. The Petitioner Should Have Been Afforded an Opportunity for Discovery 
and an Evidentiary Hearing 
The State avers that we argued "unsupported by authority" that the 
trial court should have allowed us to develop and present evidence. To 
make our argument clear, the standard here is really the same as 
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summary judgment. As cited above, "[s]ummary dismissal is permissible 
only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of 
material fact, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the 
applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an 
evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Downing, supra, at 863 
(emphasis added). Citing Gonzales at 763; Hoover at 146; Ramirez at 89. 
This is more than sufficient support for Petitioner's arguments. The 
Petitioner is not required to present evidence to a "preponderance of the 
evidence" standard in order to survive the intent to dismiss. Instead, the 
evidence must simply support a finding that sufficient basis for a dispute 
in material fact exists, and that if a disputed fact was resolved in the 
applicant's favor, it would entitle the Petitioner to relief. Id. 
Unquestionably, if the trial court were to hear the entire story, including 
the testimony of trial counsel, which is reflected in what the affidavits 
submitted in this case support, and could have been developed through 
discovery or an evidentiary hearing, it would likely have found that the 
applicant was affirmatively misadvised, and thus entitled to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in determining, without an evidentiary 
hearing, that the petitioner's deadline should not be equitably tolled to 
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represent his reasonable reliance on errant information, and the issue of 
affirmative misadvice was not sufficient for purposes of finding that the 
Petitioner's plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently and thus 
voluntarily. Based on the facts of the case presented through affidavit and 
confirmed by trial testimony, there was a clear misunderstanding of the 
consequences of his plea, it was not simply a "collateral" consequence, 
and thus, the plea was not intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily 
entered. The summary dismissal must be vacated and the case remanded 
for an evidentiary hearing as a matter of fundamental due process. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 3rd Day of March, 2014. 
APPELLANT REPLY 
Randolp , eal, ISB 1#6565 
Attorne:rly the Appellant 
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